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ORIGINALISM AND SECOND-ORDER IPSE DIXIT
REASONING IN CHISHOLM V. GEORGIA
D. A. JEREMY TELMAN*
ABSTRACT
This Article presents a new perspective on the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence during the Early Republic. It focuses on what I am calling second-order
ipse dixit reasoning, which occurs when Justices have to decide between two
incommensurable interpretive modalities. If first-order ipse dixit is unreasoned
decision-making, second-order ipse dixit involves an unreasoned choice between or
among two or more equally valid interpretive options. The early Court often had
recourse to second-order ipse dixit because methodological eclecticism characterized
its constitutional jurisprudence, and the early Court established no fixed hierarchy
among interpretive modalities.
Chisholm, the pre-Marshall Court’s most important constitutional decision,
illustrates second-order ipse dixit reasoning. The Justices issued their opinions
seriatim, and they did not engage with one another’s reasoning. As a result, the Court
issues a ruling, but there is no agreement as to the basis for that ruling. Rather, the
Justices present us with five separate legal essays in which they ruminate on the nature
of sovereignty and its relationship to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Scholarly engagement with the constitutional jurisprudence of the early Court has
gained new urgency because originalist scholars have recently claimed that
originalism informed the early Court’s approach to constitutional interpretation. This
Article finds that contemporary filters do not capture the essence of eighteenth-century
constitutional adjudication. Like modern textualists, the Justices of the Chisholm
Court begin their inquiries with an examination of the constitutional text. However,
the constitutional text rarely provided clear constraints on the early Court’s discretion
because, to borrow language from New Originalists, their cases arose in the “zone of
construction” where original meaning “runs out.” Justices chose among plausible
arguments about the Constitution’s meaning. At key points, the Justices simply
declared what the law was. They did so, not without justification, but also not based
on evidence of the Framers’ intent or the original meaning of the constitutional text.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION OF ORIGINALISM IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC
Most scholarship on originalism, written both by originalists and non-originalists,
acknowledges that the movement was a response to the perceived excesses of the
Warren and Burger Courts.1 Until recently, most originalists recognized that
originalism is a twentieth-century invention, not without its historical antecedents, but
not realized as a comprehensive approach to interpretation until about 200 years after

1

See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism and the
Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1261 (1987) (noting that after the
1950s, “judicial conservatives became uncomfortable with the naked exercises of raw judicial
power employed by a federal judiciary that had come to accept the realists’ vision of the judicial
role”); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 247 (2009)
(explaining that the “sweeping decisions of the Warren Court” led conservatives to insist that
“the Constitution be interpreted to give effect to the intent of the framers”); Stephen M. Griffin,
Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2008) (observing that originalism
“was driven by concerns that the Warren and Burger Courts had gone too far,” particularly in
the realms of substantive due process and equal protection); Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545,
550–54 (2006) (describing modern conservative jurisprudential thought as a response to the
judicial activism of the liberal Warren Court); Lee Strang, The Most Faithful Originalist?:
Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the Future of Originalism, 88 U. DET.-MERCY L. REV. 873,
881 (2011) (describing originalism as a “subversive movement” and acknowledging that
“[o]riginalist arguments first appeared in modern form in the 1970s”). Robert Bork dates the
movement away from originalism back to the Dred Scott decision. ROBERT BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 28–32 (1990) (crediting Dred
Scott with inventing the concept of substantive due process).
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the Framing.2 In his charming and candid defense of his own version of originalism,
Justice Scalia acknowledged as much:
It would be hard to count on the fingers of both hands and the toes of both
feet, yea, even on the hairs of one’s youthful head, the opinions that have
in fact been rendered not on the basis of what the Constitution originally
meant, but on the basis of what the judges currently thought it desirable for
it to mean.3
Some early originalists claimed that constitutional adjudication before the New Deal
was largely informed by originalist instincts. 4 Critical literature quickly undermined
that claim,5 and so-called New Originalists, writing since the 1990s, largely abandoned
it.6
Recently, in Senate testimony in support of the nomination of Neil Gorsuch to
succeed Justice Scalia on the Supreme Court, originalist scholar Lawrence Solum
observed: “For most of American history, originalism has been the predominate view
of constitutional interpretation.”7 Increasingly, originalists have begun to echo
Solum’s claim.8
2 See Lorianne Updike Toler et al., Pre-“Originalism,” 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 277,
287 (2012).
3

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. Rev. 849, 852 (1989).

4

See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 373–79 (1977) (characterizing Justice John Marshall as a strict
constructionist who attempted to give effect to the Framers’ original intent); BORK, supra note
1, at 22–24 (arguing that Justice Marshall’s opinion Marbury v. Madison was motivated by a
desire to preserve the Constitution’s original purposes); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF
MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW
(1977) (contrasting the nineteenth-century tradition of judicial “interpretation” with judicial
“legislation” beginning in the Lochner era).
5 See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 1, at 1220 (concluding that “originalist interpretation . . .
constituted neither a predominant nor exclusive interpretive methodology” in early
constitutional adjudication); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 906–07 (1985) (pointing out the Federalists’ view that the
intentions of the drafters of the Constitution would not be legally relevant because they were
“mere scriveners” appointed to draft an instrument for the people).
6 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2006) (“The idea of originalism as an exclusive theory, as the criterion for measuring
constitutional decisions, emerged only in the 1970s and 1980s.”); Randy E. Barnett, An
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 611–12 (1999) (dating the advent of
originalism to the writings of Edwin Meese and Robert Bork); Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004) (conceding that, for much of United
States history, originalism “was not a terribly self-conscious theory of constitutional
interpretation”).
7

Hearings on Nomination of the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States, at 4 (Mar. 23, 2017) (statement of Lawrence B.
Solum).
8
See, e.g., J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 34 (2012) (claiming
that Marshall “routinely displayed originalist tendencies”); Steven Calabresi, The Tradition of
the Written Constitution, Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 646 (2006)
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In this Article, I show that such claims are misleading in two ways. First, their
authors define originalism too broadly, characterizing as originalist any opinion that,
at some point, invokes the original meaning of the text or the original intent of the
Framers. By this definition, almost anybody could be considered an originalist. Nonoriginalists do not regard the Constitution as an inconvenient speed bump impeding
the delivery of their partisan version of justice. In an uncharacteristic, non-combative
moment, Justice Scalia conceded that most non-originalists are moderate and that little
separates a moderate non-originalist from his own “faint-hearted” originalism.9
Indeed, many scholars now stress the commonalities uniting originalist and nonoriginalist approaches.10 Beginning with an attempt to discern the original meaning of
the Constitution is a methodological commonality that unites originalists and nonoriginalists.11 The fact that eighteenth-century opinions reference original meaning
does not make them originalist any more than do similar references in contemporary
opinions by Justices who think that the Constitution protects a fundamental right to
privacy in the contexts of family planning and same-sex marriage.12
(characterizing Marshall’s opinions in Gibbons and McCulloch as an “attempt at a textual and
originalist interpretation”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2725 (2003) (seeing originalist textualism as implicit in Marshall’s opinion
in Marbury). John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport are a bit slippery on this issue. They begin
their book with a quotation from James Madison in support of the claim that “Originalism . . .
has been an important principle of constitutional interpretation since the early republic.” Their
language (“an important principle”) suggests that it is but one of many, but they go on to
associate that principle with the originalism of Justices Scalia and Thomas, for whom it is not
merely one of many. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE
GOOD CONSTITUTION 1 (2013) [hereinafter MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE
GOOD CONSTITUTION]. Indeed, a few pages later, they write of originalism’s “resurgence in the
latter part of the twentieth century,” as if Justice Thomas’s originalism were the same as
Madison’s originalism. Id. at 7. Later, they assert that the Marshall Court “largely articulated
an original meaning approach.” Id. at 137 (citing WOLFE, supra note 4, at 41–63). They also
accept Howard Gilman’s argument that “originalism was the standard mode of constitutional
interpretation until the Progressive Era.” Id. at 138 (citing Gillman, The Collapse of
Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the “Living Constitution” in the Course
of American State-Building, 11 STUDIES IN AM. POL. DEV. 191, 205–09 (1997)). In an endnote,
they state that originalism remained the “dominant philosophy of interpretation” into the early
twentieth century. Id. at 259 n.36.
9

Scalia, supra note 3, at 862.

10 See, e.g., JACK BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION] (arguing that constitutional
interpretation should aid in the realization of the Constitution’s overarching goal of a more
perfect union); JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (reconciling originalism and living
constitutionalism through a “text and principle” approach); Colby & Smith, supra note 1
(arguing that originalist methodology has adapted and changed in much the way that living
constitutionalism describes).
11

Non-originalists supplement historical evidence with other interpretive tools, including:
“history, tradition, precedent, purpose and consequence.” STEVEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 8
(2005); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS 6 (2009)
(advocating judicial restraint through adherence to precedent, process constraints, and
internalized norms).
12 Some self-styled originalists have offered defenses of Supreme Court decisions that have
traditionally been treated as the poster children of non-originalism. Jack Balkin provides an
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Second, these originalists rely on cherry-picked evidence and invocations of the
Framers’ intentions as confirmations that the early Court was committed to a fullydeveloped originalist methodology. As Randy Barnett, a leading New Originalist
scholar, has pointed out, the early Court at times relied on “counterfactual hypothetical
intentions of the [F]ramers.”13 Gestures towards the Framers’ intentions become the
sleight of hand through which the Justices obscure other interpretive modalities, such
as appeals to natural law or pragmatic considerations. Some early court decisions
preface their ipse dixit (conclusory) judgments with invocations of original intent, thus
masking subjective opinions with rhetorical appeals to authority.14 Often, when
eighteenth-century judges reference original meaning or intention, they actually pay
no mind to evidence of either, and generally they have no choice in the matter, because
evidence of original meaning or intent was scant or anecdotal until the advent of
originalist scholarship in the last third of the twentieth century. 15
In what follows, I show that the modern distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism does not really capture the nature of constitutional adjudication in the
Chisholm Court. Part II lays out four frameworks that inform the Article’s analysis of
Chisholm: (1) the rather malleable concept of “originalism;” (2) non-hierarchical
interpretive pluralism; (3) the eighteenth-century practice of issuing opinions seriatim;
and (4) what I call second-order ipse dixit reasoning. Part III examines the opinions in
Chisholm v. Georgia16 in detail. Chisholm was the most important constitutional case
that the Court decided in the eighteenth-century, and it illuminates the early Court’s
interpretive methodologies. In Chisholm’s multiple opinions, we see various
originalist defense of abortion rights. Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 291 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion]. Will Baude contends that originalist
reasoning informed Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges. William
Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2382 (2015) [hereinafter Baude,
Is Originalism Our Law?]; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and
Same-Sex Marriage, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648 (2016) (concluding that state laws that prohibit
same-sex marriage violate the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). Most
originalists do not think that the Constitution provides a basis for either abortion rights or samesex marriage. Originalist Justices Scalia and Thomas reject the idea that the Constitution as
originally understood protects a right to privacy in the context of reproductive rights or a right
to same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632–37 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the Constitution as an originalist matter, provides no
basis for the recognition of a right to same-sex marriage); id. at 2627–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(maintaining that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment could not provide a basis
for prohibiting bans on same-sex marriages); Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007)
(Thomas, J., with Scalia, J., concurring) (reiterating the view that “the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence . . . has no basis in the Constitution”).
13 See Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?, Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1744 (2007) [hereinafter Barnett, The People or the State?]
(naming Dred Scott and Hans v. Louisiana as examples of this rhetorical strategy).

See Toler et al., supra note 2, at 281 (“[T]hose who have studied anecdotal evidence have
largely taken Justices’ claims at face value, without discovering whether the Justices’ claimed
and practiced methodology align.”); id. at 325–26 (reiterating this conclusion).
14

15 See Clinton, supra note 1, at 1213 (finding it unsurprising that originalism did not
predominate in early constitutional jurisprudence “in light of the general unavailability at that
time of primary historical materials necessary to undertake originalist research”).
16

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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interpretive methodologies at work, side by side. The Justices barely acknowledge
rival approaches and key judgments take place, as if it were, off-stage. The Justices
frame the issue in Chisholm differently, based on second-order ipse dixit decisions,
about what considerations are relevant to the resolution of the controversy. Part IV
concludes with an assessment of the lasting importance of the precedents for judicial
reasoning established during the Early Republic.
II. FRAMEWORKS
Before we delve into the interpretive techniques that inform the opinions of the
Chisholm Court, this Part introduces four frameworks that I apply to the Court’s five
opinions: (1) originalism, (2) non-hierarchical interpretive pluralism, (3) seriatim
opinions, and (4) second-order ipse dixit opinions. While Section II.A ultimately
concludes that originalism does not provide the best perspective through which to
view the work of the early Court, the piece neither supports nor opposes originalism
as an approach to contemporary problems of constitutional interpretation. Originalism
can make, and has made, many contributions to our understanding of the Constitution,
and such contributions retain their validity regardless of whether originalism helps
describe the workings of the early Court.
In Section II.B, I describe the early Court’s approach to constitutional
adjudication, which was non-hierarchical interpretive pluralism. That is, the Court
used many different interpretive modalities: textualism, intentionalism, purposivism
(teleology), structuralism, and approaches informed by historical and legal precedent,
pragmatism, logic, and common sense. The Justices established no hierarchy among
these approaches, but made use of whatever interpretive modality seemed most
appropriate to the occasion.17
Pluralism was very much in evidence in the pre-Marshall Court, because, as
discussed in Section II.C, the Justices presented their opinions seriatim. Early opinions
featured no majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions. 18 Each Justice wrote for and
reasoned for himself.19 The Justices did not engage with or consider one another’s
arguments.20 The separate opinions displayed different interpretive modalities, and
each opinion could command equal dignity as a legal precedent.
The Justices’ non-hierarchical, pluralist approach to interpretation, coupled with
seriatim opinions, meant that second-order ipse dixit reasoning, discussed in Section
II.D, bracketed the legal opinions of the early Court. Each Justice presented a legal
opinion that was a world unto itself. Each Justice chose an interpretive framework that
guided his legal reasoning. While the legal reasoning was, at times, brilliant, the
Justices made no arguments for or against the frameworks within which they reasoned.
Whatever might be the normative arguments for particular approaches to
constitutional adjudication today, Justices of the early Court applied common-law
techniques to constitutional adjudication. Their interpretive methodologies retain a
kinship with but are not reducible to either modern-day originalism or living
17

See generally id.

18

Ronald D. Rotunda, The Fall of Seriatim Opinions and the Rise of the Supreme Court,
VERDICT (Oct. 9, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/10/09/fall-seriatim-opinions-risesupreme-court.
19

Id.

20

Id.
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constitutionalism. Moreover, second-order ipse dixit decisions established the
parameters within which legal interpretation occurred and set the stage for the Justices’
public interpretive acts, their legal opinions.
A. Originalism and the Supreme Court in the Early Republic
Today, the term “originalism” encompasses an extended family of methodological
approaches.21 Some originalists welcome the term’s elasticity, but self-proclaimed
originalists sometimes challenge others’ claims to belonging within the originalist
fold.22
In order to mitigate the vagueness of the term, I have adopted Larry Solum’s
definition of originalism, comprising two components. First, the “fixation thesis”
affirms that the meaning of each constitutional clause “is fixed at the time [it] is framed
and ratified.”23 Second, the “constraint principle” stands for the view that the meaning
21
One critic of originalism has identified seventy-two different theoretical strains within
the originalist camp. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009);
see also Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 719–20
(2011) (listing various strains within originalism, including original intent, original meaning,
subjective and objective meaning, actual and hypothetical understanding, standards and general
principles, differing levels of generality, original expected application, original principles,
interpretation, construction, normative and semantic originalism); James E. Fleming, Jack
Balkin’s Constitutional Text and Principle: The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L.
REV. 669, 670 (2012) (arguing that originalists are united only in their rejection of moral
readings of the Constitution).

This is most manifest in the responses to Jack Balkin’s originalism. See, e.g., Larry
Alexander, The Method of Text and ?: Jack Balkin’s Originalism with No Regrets, 2012 ILL. L.
REV. 611 (2012) (characterizing Balkin’s “text and principle” approach as yielding the same
results as non-originalism); Fleming, supra note 22 (pointing out the similarities between
Balkin’s approach and Dworkin’s “moral reading” of the Constitution and predicting that
originalism might split into warring camps); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The
Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 ILL. L. REV. 737 (2012) (rejecting Balkin’s premise that
constitutional provisions have an abstract meaning); Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity:
Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147 (2012)
(expressing doubt as to whether Balkin’s progressive image of constitutional redemption can be
reconciled with fidelity to the constitutional text). Similarly, Eric Segall, a prominent critic of
originalism, claims that his work furthers the project of early originalists like Raoul Berger,
Robert Bork and Lina Graglia, because he, like them, focuses on judicial restraint. Segall
criticizes originalists who think activist judges can determine original meaning and overturn
legislation enacted through democratic processes. See Eric J. Segall, Judicial Engagement, New
Originalism, and the Fortieth Anniversary of “Government by the Judiciary,” FORDHAM L.
REV. ONLINE (2017) (arguing that contemporary originalism departs from classic originalism
and from early jurisprudential practice in calling for vacation of precedent absent evidence of
clear error).
22

23 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
1935, 1941 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution]. The
implications of Jonathan Gienapp’s work on the fixation thesis have not yet emerged. Gienapp
contends that the Framers did not think of the Constitution as fixing meaning in 1789, but that
they came to do so over the course of the 1790s. JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION:
FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018). However, originalists who
adhere to the fixation thesis can, consistent with Gienapp’s argument, do so based on fidelity to
how the Framers came to think of the Constitution in the 1790s or based on normative theory
untethered to the accidents of history.
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of the constitutional text should constrain those who interpret, implement, and enforce
constitutional doctrine.24 That is, originalists seek to find the original meaning and,
having found it, treat it as dispositive of constitutional disputes.
Solum’s definition leaves room for a great deal of variation among originalists.25
However, if originalism is to have any bite26—if the concept is actually to help us to
distinguish among modalities of constitutional adjudication—Solum’s two principles
are key. Originalists can, and often do, disagree on how particular cases ought to be
decided,27 and some originalists refuse to comment upon particular cases, reluctant to
permit such details to interfere with the elaboration of their theoretical models. 28 All
judges begin with the constitutional text,29 but what distinguishes originalists from
non-originalists is that originalists believe that, where original meaning is clear, there
is no need for further judicial inquiry.
Non-originalists tend to be far more skeptical about textual clarity and thus about
the text’s ability to fix meaning. The Constitution does not, as Chief Justice Marshall
put it, have “the prolixity of a legal code.”30 Instead, it features what Justice Brandeis
called “majestic generalities,”31 such as “equal protection of law” and “cruel and
unusual punishment,” to which the Framers may have expected later generations to
assign content. As a result, non-originalists find that the constitutional text often does

24

Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, supra note 23, at 1942.

James Fleming finds that this characteristic of originalism renders it a “family of
theories” rather than a coherent approach to constitutional theory. James E. Fleming, The
Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 433, 435 (2013).
25

26 See William Baude & Stephen Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 GREENBAG 2D 103, 107–08
(2016) (specifying that originalism’s bite requires following our original Constitution as
lawfully changed, and listing Supreme Court opinions that likely do not meet this standard).
27 See D. A. Jeremy Telman, Originalism: A Thing Worth Doing . . ., 42 OHIO N. U. L. REV.
529, 548 & nn.131–33 (2016) [hereinafter Telman, Originalism] (providing examples of basic
questions that divide originalist scholars and of cases in which Justices Scalia and Thomas, both
originalists, came to different conclusions or concurred with one another based on completely
different reasoning).

See Baude & Sachs, supra note 26, at 108 (“In our theoretical work we’ve tried to avoid
getting sucked into specific historical or doctrinal controversies, as that might detract from our
arguments about theory.”). Larry Solum and Lee Strang are two additional examples of
originalist scholars who, despite voluminous writings, rarely apply their theories to specific
cases.
28

29 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 21, at 24–25 (averring that all non-originalists “explicitly
assign original meaning or intentions a significant role in the interpretive enterprise”); Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 236
(1980) (noting that even nonoriginalists accord “presumptive weight to the text and original
history”); David A. Strauss, The Supreme Court, 2014 Term—Foreword: Does the Constitution
Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015) (“It is never acceptable to announce that
you are ignoring the text . . . .”).
30

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).

31 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (writing with
trepidation of the judge’s task of translating majestic generalities into concrete restraints on state
officials).
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not significantly bind judicial discretion.32 Even when the text is clear, non-originalists
do not think that constitutional interpreters need be bound absolutely to original
meaning.33
It requires considerable work of translation to apply any version of contemporary
originalism to the constitutional jurisprudence of the Early Republic. Because the
Constitution was the first of its kind, there was no consensus about the interpretive
method or methods appropriate to this unique document. 34 The Justices nevertheless
undertook constitutional interpretation without much discussion of the appropriate
methodology for doing so. 35 Faced with specific questions of constitutional
interpretation on which the Framers themselves were sharply divided, the early
Justices made interpretive choices that were not dictated by the Constitution itself and
were constrained, but not determined by general interpretive canons. 36 The Justices
were not far enough removed from the time of the founding for there to be occasion
to introduce the notion of a living constitution, but, as Jonathan Gienapp’s work
indicates, the Framers did not subscribe to the notion that the Constitution could have
a fixed meaning and purpose in 1789.37 That idea slowly took root during debates over
the Constitution’s meaning in the 1790s.38
As we shall see, in the Early Republic, constitutional adjudication often took place
in what contemporary New Originalists call the “zone of construction” 39 in which
original meaning “runs out.”40 That is, when the early Supreme Court faced
32 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 29, at 59–60 (highlighting the difference between the
Constitution’s “majestic generalities” and technical provisions and noting that the former are
treated as statements of general principles and not as binding authority).
33

See Brest, supra note 29, at 237 (observing that nonoriginalists treat text and original
history as presumptively binding and limiting but not as dispositive).
34 See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Originalism All the Way Down?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 159–
61 (2014) [hereinafter Lash, Originalism All the Way Down?] (rejecting the notion that
interpretive methodologies appropriate to state constitutions could be applied to the federal
Constitution and stressing ways in which the unique nature of the latter called for different
interpretive approaches); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 519, 560–78 (2003) (discussing different interpretive traditions at the time of the
Framing).
35

See generally Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).

36 See Lash, Originalism All the Way Down?, supra note 34, at 154–65 (describing
methodological heterodoxy in constitutional interpretation at the time of the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution and during the Early Republic).
37

GIENAPP, supra note 23, at 1.

38

See id. at 1–19 (introducing his thesis that the conception of the Constitution as fixed
was not inevitable and was developed in the course of debates among the Founders in the
1790s).
39

See Keith Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 119, 123 (2010) (arguing that once interpretive tools are exhausted, constitutional
decision-makers operate within a zone of construction, where they undertake “a particularly
political task, a creative task involving normative choices in a realm of constitutional
indeterminacies”).
40 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
65, 69 (2011) (acknowledging that the meaning of the Constitution sometimes runs out and that
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constitutional issues, those issues had never been ruled on before (cases of “first
impression”), and the constitutional text provided no clear solutions. In such
circumstances, even today, the lines between originalism and non-originalism are
fuzzy.41
In the eighteenth-century, the meta-interpretive frame in which constitutional
interpretation occurred was itself within the zone of construction. By “metainterpretive,” I mean that the Justices addressed subjects of interpretation that also
provided the framework for resolving other interpretive issues. 42 Meta-interpretive
frames establish the parameters within which constitutional decision-makers can
resolve particular interpretive issues.43 In Chisholm, for example, that subject was the
question of sovereignty.44 Because the Framers disagreed about the theory of
sovereignty informing the Constitution, originalism cannot resolve these metainterpretive issues. Constitutional decision-makers must resort to sources of authority
other than the Constitution’s original meaning to resolve them. I have argued
elsewhere that differences between originalists and non-originalists may amount to
disagreements about how often original meaning runs out. 45 In the eighteenth-century,
because interpretation took place within a non-originalist meta-interpretive frame,
original meaning ran out before interpretation began. 46
B. Non-Hierarchical Interpretive Pluralism
The Constitution is a unique document. During the Framing and the Early Republic
there were no fixed rules for the interpretation of a written constitution. 47 Caleb Nelson
elaborates:
Did such a document trigger the rules of interpretation applicable to an
ordinary statute? To a treaty? To a contract? Might different aspects of the
Constitution implicate different sets of preexisting conventions, so that a
hybrid approach was appropriate? Could special canons of construction,
not applicable to any ordinary legal documents, be derived from the
Constitution’s unique context and purpose? If so, what were those canons?
“[o]riginalism is not a theory of what to do when original meaning runs out”); Lawrence B.
Solum, Semantic Originalism 19 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research,
Paper
Series
No.
07-24,
2008),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id_1120244 (observing that when the meaning
of the constitutional text is underdetermined, original meaning “runs out” and must be
supplemented with constitutional construction).
41 See ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 98–99 (2018) (arguing that Solum’s two
originalist principles play a very small role in the zone of construction and thus do not help
judges decide hard constitutional questions).
42 D. A. Jeremy Telman, All That Is Liquidated Melts into Air: Five Meta-Interpretive
Issues, 24 BARRY L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
43

Id.

44

See infra, Part III.C.

45

Telman, Originalism, supra note 27, at 551.

46

See infra, Part III.C.

47

See Nelson, supra note 34, at 555.
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The answers to these questions were far from clear, and members of the
founding generation expressed a variety of different views. 48
For example, Nelson cites an 1820 case from a South Carolina court in which the judge
lamented, “The Constitution of the United States . . . is so unlike those instruments for
which the common law has provided rules of construction, that a Court must always
feel itself embarrassed whenever called upon to expound any part in the smallest
degree doubtful.”49 In his treatise on the Constitution, Joseph Story concluded that
disagreements about the Constitution’s meaning resulted from “the want of some
uniform rules of interpretation, expressly or tacitly agreed on by the disputants.” 50
Consistent with these later statements, eighteenth-century adjudication was
pluralist and non-hierarchical. As a result, it is inconsistent with forms of
contemporary originalism that privilege one interpretive modality (for example,
textualism or intentionalism) over others.51 Constitutional adjudication in the
eighteenth century is also inconsistent with John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport’s
“original methods originalism,” to the extent that that approach excludes modalities
that were common during the founding era.52
48

Id. at 555–56.

Id. at 569 (citing M’Clarin v. Nesbit, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.), *519–20 (S.C. Ct. App.
1820) (Huger)).
49

50

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (1833) § 398, at 1:304.

51

Not all forms of originalism require a choice or a preference. McGinnis and Rappaport
find intentionalism and textualism equally valid. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM
AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 137 (finding substantial support for textualism
and some support for intentionalism in the evidence of the interpretive approach of the Framers).
52 McGinnis and Rappaport argue that constitutional construction was not an original
method. See John O. McGinnis & Michael R. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. L. REV. 751, 773 (2009)
[hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods] (“[A]dvocates of construction have not
provided evidence that anyone embraced construction at the time of the Constitution's
enactment, and we have been able to find none.”). However, William Baude and Stephen Sachs,
who likewise offer a version of original methods originalism, think construction was an original
method. See Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 12, at 2357–58 (acknowledging that
originalists turn to construction or liquidation to resolve ambiguities or vagueness in the
constitutional text); William Baude & Stephen Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 1079, 1128 (2017) (finding the distinction between interpretation and construction “both
real and useful”).

McGinnis and Rappaport also argue that living constitutionalism was not an original method.
McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods, supra note 52, at 788–92. The claim is empirical,
and I cannot address it fully in this space. Because McGinnis and Rappaport say they find no
evidence of construction, only a few counterexamples are necessary to suggest that their review
of original methods is either incomplete or conceptually flawed.
While the example is not clear-cut, Joseph Story provides evidence that the Framers considered
a change in circumstances as grounds for ignoring a statute’s commands.
We find it laid down in some of our earliest authorities in the common law;
and civilians are accustomed to a similar expression, cessante legis praemio,
cessat et ipsa lex [the law itself ceases if the reason for the law ceases].
Probably it has a foundation in the exposition of every code of written law,

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

11

2019]

ORIGINALISM AND SECOND-ORDER IPSE DIXIT

570

There have been several attempts at enumerating typologies of legal reasoning.
John Hart Ely identifies six modes of non-originalist (“non-interpretivist” is his term)
interpretation: (1) natural law, (2) a judge’s values, (3) neutral principles, (4) reason,
(5) tradition, and (6) consensus.53 Philip Bobbitt’s typology is probably the most wellknown. He identifies six modalities of argument: (1) historical, (2) textual, (3)
doctrinal, (4) prudential, (5) structural, and (6) ethical. 54 Richard Fallon identifies five
modalities: (1) text, (2) historical intent, (3) constitutional theory, (4) precedent, and
(5) values.55 Both Bobbitt and Fallon note that it is often difficult to isolate and identify
individual modes of argumentation, because judges tend to use interpretive modalities
in combination, and each is used to reinforce the same result. 56 Jack Balkin identifies
eleven “topics” (topoi or modalities) of constitutional argument.57 His modalities
differ from Bobbitt’s in that Balkin does not think that modalities are necessarily
“incommensurable”; that is, Balkin believes modalities are tools that can be combined
to aid in constitutional construction. He also contends that one can overcome
arguments based on one modality with arguments drawn from another. 58
In my reading of the opinions of the early Court, I see Justices engaged in nine
well-recognized interpretive modalities: (1) textualism, (2) intentionalism, (3)
structuralism, (4) purposivism (teleology) and (5) appeals to precedent, (6) history, (7)
morals, (8) logic, or (9) common sense, which may also entail pragmatic
considerations. Like Bobbitt, I acknowledge that there may be additional modalities, 59
but these seem to me to be the main ones. The Justices freely deploy whichever
interpretive modality strikes them as fitting for the case. They frequently combine

from the universal principle of interpretation, that the will and intention of
the legislature is to be regarded and followed.
STORY, supra note 50, § 459, at 1:350. The context makes clear that Story thinks the Latin
maxim applies to the Constitution, which suggests an endorsement of something like living
constitutionalism.
53 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
(1980).
54

AND

DISTRUST: A THEORY

PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY
[hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE].

OF THE

OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW 44–69

CONSTITUTION 7–8 (1984)

55 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (1987).
56 See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 55, at 8 (“The various arguments
illustrated often work in combination”); Fallon, supra note 56, at 1240 (“The implicit norms of
our practice of constitutional interpretation prescribe an effort to achieve plausible
understandings of arguments from text, the framers’ intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and
relevant values, all of which point to the same result.”).
57

Jack Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641,
659–61 (2013).
58 Jack Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution: The Topics in Constitutional Construction
(forthcoming
in
CONST.
COMMENT.
(2018))
(manuscript
at
209),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3133131 [hereinafter Balkin, Arguing about the Constitution].
59

See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 54, at 8 (acknowledging that his list
might not be complete and that it could be supplemented).
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interpretive modalities as all supporting the same outcome, but in seriatim opinions,
it is easy to see that the modalities are often at odds.
What happens when different modalities lead to different conclusions, as they
often do? In such circumstances, second-order ipse dixit reasoning comes into play.
For Bobbitt, this means that conflicts among different modalities must be resolved by
recourse to individual moral sensibility or conscience,60 which are more likely to be
stated than argued. Statements of moral sensibility or conscience constitute modes of
second-order ipse dixit reasoning, but they are not the only ones. My typology differs
from others in that it stresses the extent to which the judgments of the early Court
turned on a tenth and largely unacknowledged modality: second-order ipse dixit
reasoning.
C. Second-Order Ipse Dixit Reasoning
1. Cases of First Impression and Second-Order Ipse Dixit
A pluralistic approach to interpretation permits judges to exercise, consciously or
unconsciously, considerable discretion.61 Where different interpretive approaches can
lead to different results, the judge may choose the approach that accords with her own
sense of justice, practicality, or fairness to the parties to the dispute. To this day, even
originalists have articulated no hierarchy of interpretive modalities that could cabin
judicial discretion.62
60 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 168 (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION] (contending that the Constitution relies “on the individual
moral sensibility when the modalities of argument clash”).
61
See CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF
LAW 34 (1996) (arguing that Marshall learned from his time as a Virginia practitioner “that
judges in the ordinary course of deciding cases had broad discretion to determine what the law
was, compelled as they were to choose from a variety of sources”).
62 John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport do not explain how their “original methods”
originalism resolves issues when different interpretive modalities lead to contradictory results.
See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods, supra note 52, at 752 (introducing their
conclusion that living constitutionalism and constitutional construction were not among the
original methods but that ambiguity and vagueness could be resolved by considering evidence
of history, structure, purpose, and intent). Will Baude recognizes a hierarchy with originalism
at the top. See Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 12, at 2353. However, his is an
inclusive originalism, embracing multiple interpretive modalities. See id. at 2355 (describing an
“inclusive” originalism that recognizes “the validity of other methods of interpretation or
decision”). Moreover, Baude concedes “a certain amount of [judicial] discretion both in
articulating the rules and in deciding whether to apply them in a particular case.” Id. at 2360.
Jack Balkin maintains that lawyers and judges who “embrace multiple interpretive theories”
may “adopt a hierarchical ordering,” but he does not seem to think such a hierarchy is necessary,
nor does he say what it is. Balkin, Arguing about the Constitution, supra note 58, manuscript at
215. Richard Fallon offers a hierarchy, but also argues (persuasively) that, in practice, the
hierarchy may be flipped:

I shall argue, the implicit norms of our constitutional practice accord the foremost
authority to arguments from text, followed, in descending order, by arguments
concerning the framers’ intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and moral and policy
values. But a caution is in order. For reasons to be explored later, the highest ranked
categories are those in which any particular argument, in hard cases, is least likely to
prove uniquely persuasive or determinate. Arguments from text and from the
framers’ intent therefore possess less independent influence than their hierarchical

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

13

2019]

ORIGINALISM AND SECOND-ORDER IPSE DIXIT

572

In the absence of an interpretive hierarchy or a coherent interpretive scheme,
second-order ipse dixit reasoning can settle matters. Ultimately, judges deciding
constitutional cases of first impression decide by deciding, when there is no other way
to do so.
Lacking either precedent or evidence of a clear consensus among the Framers,
Justices of the early Court often had recourse to second-order ipse dixit decisions in
constitutional adjudication. We think of ipse dixit judgments as devoid of all
reasoning. Second-order ipse dixit judgments are not without justification, but they are
decisions made at a crossroad where the arguments in favor of one path or another are
equally valid. The judge decides simply by choosing one of two equally viable options.
As we shall see in Part III, second-order ipse dixit judgments assert the correctness of
the chosen path and ignore the alternative or waive it away with incredulity.
Because case law now significantly hems in judges’ discretion, ipse
dixit judgments are less common today. Still, they are not unheard of. Philip Bobbitt
relates a story of a troubled Judge Henry Friendly who sought counsel from Judge
Learned Hand on how to resolve a difficult case. 63 According to Bobbitt, Learned
Hand’s advice was, “Damn it, Henry, just decide it! That’s what you’re paid for.”64
Bobbitt agrees. In difficult cases, Bobbitt acknowledges, interpretive modalities do
not constrain the judge. “The case must be decided.”65
2. Varieties of Ipse Dixit
Judges never reveal their ipse dixit methods by announcing as the ground for their
decision, “Because I say so.” Moreover, because judges want their reasoning sound in
law, rather than in other normative realms, they are unlikely to volunteer the non-legal
reasons that guide them into their legal analysis. Instead, judges disguise their ipse
dixit reasoning as other things. Thus, ipse dixit reasoning can be hard to identify and
can take many forms.
In the early Court, appeals to the Framers frequently serve as both a prelude to and
a disguise for ipse dixit pronouncements. There is, after all, a great difference between
invocations of intentionalism and actual engagement in intentionalist methods of
constitutional interpretation. Justices in the Early Republic would frequently state that
they wanted to discern the intentions of the Framers, but they rarely made specific
references to Framing-era texts.66 In most cases, when nineteenth-century Justices
invoked the Framers or the Constitutional Convention or the ratification conventions,
status suggests. By contrast, although value arguments occupy the lowest rung in the
hierarchy, they are likely to exert a very powerful influence on conclusions within
other categories in a successful effort to reach coherence.

Fallon, supra note 55, at 1193–94.
63

BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 60, at 166–67.

64

Id. at 167.

65

Id.

66

See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 231 (1995) (calling appeals to the Framers
“a literary device”); Toler et al., supra note 2, at 308–09 (concluding that in its first hundred
years, the Supreme Court specifically referenced individual Framers only twenty-one times, and
most of those refer to influential people from the Framing era who did not actually participate
in the Framing or to Framers who wrote in their personal capacity).
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they would not specify a Framer, a part of the Constitutional Convention, or the
ratification convention of a particular state.67
Justices rarely referenced documents from the period beginning with the
convening of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 through the ratification of the Bill
of Rights in 1791.68 Early Justices drew on their own recollections of the founding
events, but those recollections were by no means always in accord.
The early Court’s failure to research the intentions of the Framers is unsurprising,
given that the source materials that make originalism possible today were not available
to eighteenth-century judges. George Washington held on to the official records of the
debates from the Constitutional Convention.69 Washington eventually handed over
those records, which are incomplete, to John Quincy Adams, who published them in
1819.70 That version was edited and more widely circulated in 1830.71 James
Madison’s influential account of the Constitutional Convention was first published in
1840.72 Just after Madison’s account appeared, there was a brief increase in reliance
on historical materials relating to the Constitution’s drafting and ratification, 73 but its
appearance did not transform constitutional jurisprudence. Late nineteenth-century
constitutional adjudication looked a lot like late eighteenth-century constitutional
adjudication in terms of its consultation of source materials relating to the
Constitution’s drafting and ratification. 74
The first scholarly edition of the Constitutional Convention did not appear until
1911.75 Powerful criticisms have been raised with respect to the accuracy of Madison’s

67

Toler et al., supra note 2, at 310.

68

See id. at 304–05 (finding that less than 10% of citations to historical materials reference
materials from the period of the Framing). Early on, Paul Brest noted that “if you consider the
evolution of doctrines in just about any extensively-adjudicated area of constitutional
law . . . explicit reliance on originalist sources has played a very small role compared to the
elaboration of the Court’s own precedents.” Brest, supra note 29, at 234.
69 Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the Official Records of the Federal Convention?, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1620, 1626 (2012) [hereinafter Bilder, How Bad?].
70

Id.

71

Id.

72

JAMES MADISON, DEBATES

IN THE

FEDERAL CONVENTION

OF

1787 (Gordon Lloyd ed.,

2014).
See Clinton, supra note 1, at 1219 (“The publication of Madison’s notes in 1840 sparked
a renewed interpretive interest in the treasure of historical material that his papers contained.”).
73

74 See Toler et al., supra note 2, at 302–17 (observing that reference to sources from the
Framing period was extremely rare in the Court’s first 100 years, and most of those references
came during the Marshall Court).
75

THE RECORDS
[hereinafter Farrand].
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account76 and as to the official records of the Constitutional Convention. 77 Such
accounts are most relevant to intentionalists. Because most twenty-first-century
originalists are more concerned with original public meaning than they are with
original intent, the more important documents relate not to the drafting of the
Constitution in Philadelphia but to its ratification in the several States.
But there, the situation is no better. The first comprehensive scholarly account of
the ratification was published in 2010.78 Even today, the documentary record relating
to ratification is incomplete.79 We have detailed records of some ratification
assemblies and almost none relating to others. 80 Making sense of the ratification
records is also a challenge, because the process took two years. 81 Caleb Nelson
contends that “conventions that ratified the Constitution early on (like Delaware and
Pennsylvania) surely viewed the document differently in some respects than
conventions that acted later (like Virginia and New York).”82 As a result, Nelson
concludes, originalists seeking to enforce the ratifiers’ understanding of the
Constitution “would have a menu of ideas to choose from.” 83
The record of deliberations relating to the Bill of Rights is also problematic. The
first Congress discussed the Amendments, so we know something of the issues up for
debate.84 However, the congressional debates leave many fundamental issues
unresolved.85 Moreover, the final text was the product of a committee that kept no
76 See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION (2015) (contending that Madison revised his account of the Convention in the
years after the Convention to reflect his evolving views of the Constitution in action and of the
men responsible for drafting it).
77 See Bilder, How Bad?, supra note 70, at 1623 (defending the usefulness of the official
records and the competence of the recording secretary against Max Farrand’s assessment that
the records are flawed and the secretary incompetent).
78 PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–88
(2010); see id. at x (discussing previous scholarship on ratification, the best of which consisted
of two edited collections that appeared in 1988 and 1989 but which devoted separate chapters
to the ratification process in each state and thus missed part of the story).
79 See id. at xiii–xiv (describing the way Federalists conspired to create a one-sided record
of the ratification debates that favored their perspective).
80 See id. at xii (noting that in the twenty-one-volume collection, The Documentary History
of the Ratification of the Constitution, the records for Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, and
Connecticut take up one volume, while four volumes are devoted to Virginia and five to New
York).
81

See Nelson, supra note 34, at 585.

82

Id.

83 Id. at 588; see also STORY, supra note 50, § 406, at 1:309 (observing that “there can be
no certainty, either that the different State conventions in ratifying the Constitution gave the
same uniform interpretation to its language, or that even in a single State convention the same
reasoning prevailed with a majority, much less with the whole of the supporters of it”).
84

See generally CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).

FROM THE

85 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process
of Law,” 77 MISS. L.J. 1, 155 (2007) (observing that the legislative history does not clarify
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minutes of its proceedings and of a vote in the Senate, whose deliberations were secret
by design.86 We know almost nothing of the state deliberations concerning adoption
of the Bill of Rights.87
A recent comprehensive review of the Supreme Court’s reliance on history and
precedent found that, while the Court has generally espoused intentionalism, it has,
throughout its history, strayed from intentionalist practice.88 The authors conclude that
nineteenth-century constitutional adjudication was far more akin to common law
adjudication, than it was to contemporary intentionalism.89 Surprisingly, they find that
references to sources from the Constitution’s drafting history and ratification have
become much more common in Supreme Court opinions written since 1980.90
Justices in the Early Republic sometimes invoke the Framers’ intentions when they
are actually just ascribing their own interpretation to the Framers.91 While the Supreme
Court frequently invokes the intentions of the Framers in constitutional adjudication,92
through the nineteenth century, the Court rarely sought after or ruled based on those
intentions.93 All of this is consistent with the early originalists’ self-understanding of
originalism as a self-conscious approach to constitutional interpretation dating from
the last third of the twentieth century. 94

whether “due process” was intended to incorporate common-law standards); Michael Anthony
Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation Through the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 MO. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) (noting that the legislative
history does not clarify whether Congress intended for the Bill of Rights to apply to the states);
H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513,
1533 (1987) (calling the legislative history of the Bill of Rights “exceptionally unreliable”).
86

See RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS
204 (2006) (noting that “little is known about the debate” in the Senate that winnowed the Bill
of Rights down from seventeen amendments to twelve because “the Senate met behind closed
doors until 1794, and thus the record of their discussion is sparse”).
87

See Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1424 (1991) (citing multiple authorities).
88 See Toler et al., supra note 2, at 283, 328 apps. 1–18 (2012) (recording references to
historical sources in Supreme Court majority opinions, concurrences and dissents, including
references to historical sources, precedent, secondary sources, and commentary on interpretive
methodology).
89

Id. at 314.

90

Id. at 285.

91

See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Marbury, Marshall, and the Politics of Constitutional
Judgment, 89 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1221 (2003) (noting that John Marshall derived “the Framers’
intent from his theory of constitutional purposes, not the other way around”).
See Toler et al., supra note 2, at 301 (finding that 60% of the Court’s statements regarding
its own interpretive method in cases of constitutional first impression are best described as
intentionalist).
92

93 See id. at 303 (concluding upon closer inspection that the Justices may have been doing
something other than actually relying on the intention of the Constitution’s creators).
94

See id. at 287 & n.23 (dating the advent of the originalist movement in the 1980s and
acknowledging that Justice Black’s originalist positions were generally stated in dissent).
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As I illustrate in Part III with the Chisholm opinions of Justices Blair and Cushing,
ipse dixit reasoning can look like textualism. A judge can provide a dispositive textual
interpretation, while ignoring, or downplaying, the significance of a rival textual
interpretation of similar plausibility. Moreover, teleological interpretations can exist
in tension with textual readings, and judges freely avail themselves of both, thus
enabling them to favor textual or teleological approaches based on ipse dixit hunches.
Most commonly, evidence of ipse dixit reasoning must be looked for outside of the
opinion in which it occurs. Seriatim opinions help us to see the roads not only not
taken but bypassed without comment. The point here is to show the range of available
approaches and the Court’s lack of consistency in its reliance or non-reliance on
available approaches.
3. Ipse Dixit as a Descriptive, Not a Normative, Term
Second-order ipse dixit decisions are not arbitrary decisions. Judges are
constrained through the usual mechanisms, including history, precedent, prudential
considerations, logic, and common sense. In addition, they are disciplined by their
courts’ cultures of collegiality. Because Supreme Court opinions are matters of public
record, Justices take care to write opinions that will garner approbation from their
colleagues on the bench, the legal profession, and the court-watching public.95
More generally, Jack Balkin has argued persuasively that judges are bound by
something akin to a fiduciary duty of good faith interpretation, which exerts its own
constraining pull on judges.96 Balkin’s version of originalism requires fidelity to
constitutional principles, but not to the Framers’ original expectations regarding how
the constitutional text would be applied in specific situations. 97 As he puts it:
Constitutional interpretation by judges requires fidelity to the Constitution
as law. Fidelity to the Constitution as law means fidelity to the words of the
text, understood in terms of their original meaning, and to the principles
that underlie the text. It follows from these premises that constitutional
interpretation is not limited to those applications specifically intended or
expected by the [F]ramers and adopters of the constitutional text. 98
Our common-law legal culture entails extensive judicial elaboration of the legal
reasoning that leads to the holding. This tradition of discursive rationality constrains
judges in ways that the political branches are not constrained. Legislation may be the
product of horse-trading and back-room deals. Executive officers exercise
considerable discretion and, absent scandal and investigation, need not explain their
actions or inaction, or even their decision-making processes. Judges, by contrast, must
justify their rulings and they do not want their reputations as apolitical and impartial
95
On the influence of public opinion on the Court, see generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE
WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED
THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
96 See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 10, at 103–04 (arguing that
fidelity to the text is the entire point of interpretation and arguing that judges and lawyers,
regardless of whether they understand themselves as originalists, adhere to constitutional
fidelity).
97

See Balkin, Abortion, supra note 12, at 295.

98

See id.
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arbiters of legal disputes tainted by evidence of political partisanship, conflicts of
interest, or reasoning to a pre-ordained result. Politicians, journalists, and judges
empowered to challenge precedent will scorn and ridicule partisan or poorly reasoned
judicial opinions.99
I do not intend the phrase ipse dixit in a pejorative sense, nor do I think ipse dixit
reasoning is inconsistent with Balkin’s idea of constitutional fidelity. Different
modalities of constitutional interpretation might align. For example, the constitutional
requirement that the President be at least thirty-five years old100 is uncontroversial
because all interpretive modalities lead to the same conclusion as to the provision’s
meaning.101 But, different modalities might also yield different results. A judge might
be persuaded that the common understanding of the word “commerce” as used in the
eighteenth-century connotes only “trade,” and not “manufacturing” or “navigation.” 102
However, the same judge might also conclude that the purpose of the Commerce
Clause is to empower Congress to regulate the economy in ways that the states cannot
or will not.103 The textual meaning and the purposive meaning are at odds, and the
judge must choose between two plausible meanings of the constitutional text. When
equally authoritative interpretive modalities are in conflict, they are incommensurable.
A textual argument cannot defeat a structural argument, and a structural argument
cannot defeat a textual argument.104 In the Early Republic, the Court often heard
constitutional cases of first impression in which various interpretive modalities
pointed towards different outcomes, and the Justices had to choose among equally
plausible renderings of the Constitution’s meaning.105 The Justices took care to put up

99
100

Id. at 335 & n.114.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.

See Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 342 (2013) (noting
the “virtually unanimous agreement” that the Constitution “requires that the President of the
United States be at least thirty-five years old” and that “[n]o reasonable interpretive gloss can
disrupt sufficiently that plain meaning so as to alter the Article II rule”).
101

102

See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 856–62 (2003) (finding that the term “commerce” connoted only
trade and exchange of goods when used in the Pennsylvania Gazette between 1728 and 1800);
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101
(2001) (finding that the word “commerce” was used to mean only trade and exchange of goods
in the records of the Constitutional Convention, the ratification debates, and the Federalist
Papers); Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism 22–23 (unpublished
manuscript) (forthcoming in U. PENN. L. REV (2018)), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3036206.
See Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (arguing that Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers were part of a structural design “to give Congress power to legislate
in all cases where states are separately incompetent or where the interests of the nation might
be undermined by unilateral or conflicting state action”).
103

104

If the text is absolutely clear and cannot in any circumstances be reconciled with a
purposive or structural argument, the text prevails. See STORY, supra note 50, § 401, at 1:306
(observing that no recourse to alternative interpretive means is necessary where “the words are
plain and clear”). However, that situation rarely, if ever, obtained in the constitutional
adjudication of the Early Republic.
105 D. A. Jeremy Telman, John Marshall’s Constitution: Distinguishing Originalism from
Ipse Dixit in Constitutional Adjudication 19 (Valparaiso Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies
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signposts to highlight their engagement in traditional, acceptable interpretive
modalities, but ultimately, they had to choose among equally authoritative but nonreconcilable options.
Ipse dixit reasoning is neither originalist nor living constitutionalist reasoning.
Equally importantly, ipse dixit reasoning is not opposed to originalism or livingconstitutionalism. A recent example may help illustrate this point. In discussing a
five–four decision of the Supreme Court in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,106
Nelson Lund notes that the majority and the dissent agreed that the case could not be
resolved based on the constitutional text, its legislative history, or the Court’s
precedents.107 In Thornton, the Court invalidated an Arkansas law that required
incumbent Senators to run as write-in candidates after two terms, as well as an
incumbent Member of Congress’s ability to do so after three terms. 108 Absent a firm
footing in text, history or precedent, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, relied
on “basic principles of our democratic system,” 109 which he found articulated in a
speech attributed to Alexander Hamilton.110 Justice Thomas, writing for the dissenters,
relied on a different fundamental principle. For Justice Thomas, our federal
government is one of limited and enumerated powers. 111 Powers not granted to the
federal government are reserved to the states. 112
Even though Justice Stevens’ and Justice Thomas’ inclinations lie on different
sides of the originalism fault-line, that is not what separates them in this case. Rather,
they each make decisions based on other principles and their judgments in the case
follow from those principles, which are arrived at not by debating the principles, but
by stating them.113 Originalists and non-originalists both engage in such second-order
ipse dixit reasoning. During the Early Republic, when second-order ipse dixit
reasoning predominated because so many constitutional issues could not be resolved
by appeals to text or intention, the originalism/non-originalism divide does little
explanatory work.

Research
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3249726.
106

18-9,

2018),

514 U.S. 779 (1995).

107

Nelson Lund, Judicial Supremacy: Palladium of Liberty or Academic Paradox, 33
CONST. COMMENT. 45, 45–46 (2018) (reviewing MARTIN REDISH, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (2017)).
108

Id. at 45.

109

Thornton, 514 U.S. at 806.

110

Lund, supra note 108, at 46.

111

Id.

112

Thornton, 514 U.S. at 847–48 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

113 See Lund, supra note 108, at 46 (“Rather than respond to Stevens with an alternative
theory of democracy, Thomas relies on a legal principle that he thinks is implied by the
Constitution’s enumeration of powers.”).
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D. The Eighteenth-Century Tradition of Seriatim Opinions
In the 1790s, Supreme Court Justices issued their opinions seriatim.114 Each Justice
spoke for himself.115 They engaged the arguments of the attorneys, but they did not
attack, or even acknowledge, one another’s reasoning. “For almost a thousand years,
decisions of multimember courts in England were delivered orally by each judge
seriatim and without any prior intracourt consultation.”116 David Currie contends that
the practice of seriatim opinions made it difficult to know what the Court’s holding
was in any given case,117 and the absence of an authoritative majority opinion
weakened the Court as a political institution. 118
John Marshall ended the practice of seriatim opinions in a self-conscious effort to
enhance the prestige of the Court, by having it speak with one voice. 119 Marshall’s
strategy of insisting on consensus paid off, elevating the Court, and Marshall, who
signed most of the Court’s important opinions while he was Chief Justice. 120 It also
reduced or eliminated the cacophony produced by seriatim opinions, and thus clarified
the law, while also making the legal process less transparent.
As we shall see, in Chisholm, the Court’s tradition of issuing seriatim opinions
made it possible for the Justices to engage in a variety of interpretive approaches
without having to explain or justify their methodological decisions. In Chisholm,
textual (Cushing and Blair), historical (Iredell, Jay, and Wilson), precedential (Iredell),
and purposive (Jay and Wilson) approaches are on display. The Justices do not strive
towards consensus either as to outcome or approach. They tacitly acknowledge the
validity of diverse approaches and seem to welcome that diversity as a check against
dogmatism or groupthink.
III. SECOND-ORDER IPSE DIXIT IN CHISHOLM V. GEORGIA
A. Ipse Dixit and Constitutional Fidelity
For the most part, before the Marshall Court, Congress rather than the courts
decided constitutional questions, as David Currie has detailed.121 However, Chisholm
114 See Scott Douglas Gerber, Introduction: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall, in
SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 1, 20 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed.,
1998) [hereinafter GERBER, SERIATIM].
115

See id.

116

M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 292 (2008).
117 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS, 1789–1888, 44–45 (1985) [hereinafter CURRIE, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS].
118

Id. at 55.

119 See GERBER, SERIATIM, supra note 115, at 20 (explaining the strategy behind Marshall’s
abandonment of the tradition of seriatim opinions). Chief Justice Ellsworth tried to do away
with the practice of seriatim opinions, but his efforts were only partially successful. See CASTO,
supra note 66, at 110–11.
120

GERBER, SERIATIM, supra note 115, at 20.

121 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801
(1999); see CURRIE, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS supra note 118, at 4 (listing Chisholm as one
of three “full-scale opinions construing the Constitution before the Marshall Court”).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

21

2019]

ORIGINALISM AND SECOND-ORDER IPSE DIXIT

580

provides an important exception.122 It also illustrates the extent to which constitutional
interpretation in the Early Republic turned on second-order ipse dixit reasoning.
The legal issue in Chisholm was whether federal courts could exercise jurisdiction
over a suit brought against a state by a citizen of another state. 123 Chisholm raised the
important political and constitutional issue of state sovereignty. 124 If states could be
hailed into court by ordinary citizens, they were not sovereigns, but as the Georgia
legislature put it, “tributary corporations to the government of the United States.”125 In
addition, Chisholm had important economic implications. If Chisholm prevailed,
states could be inundated with claims from loyalists or their heirs for debts that state
laws had liquidated.126 States faced significant potential liability.127 Maryland,
Virginia, New York, and Massachusetts all faced similar suits. 128
Chisholm arose out of events that took place in 1777; the claim was finally settled
in 1847.129 In 1777, a merchant named Robert Farquhar sold nearly $170,000 of goods
to the State of Georgia for the provisioning of American troops quartered near

See Barnett, The People or the State?, supra note 13, at 1730 (calling Chisholm “the first
great constitutional case decided by the Supreme Court”); Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm
Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background Principle of Strict Construction, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1577, 1691 (2009) [hereinafter Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail] (“Chisholm
was the first great constitutional case issued by the Supreme Court. . . .”).
122

123 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 466 (1793) (opinion of Cushing, J.) (“The
grand and principal question in this case is, whether a State can, by the Federal Constitution, be
sued by an individual citizen of another State?”).
124

Id. at 46–64.

125

Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1631, citing Proceedings of the
Georgia House of Representatives, Dec. 14, 1792, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1800: SUITS AGAINST THE STATES 161
(Maeva Marcus ed., 1994). [hereinafter 5 DHSC]. Others associated the exposure of states to
suits by ordinary citizens with a reduction of their status from sovereigns to corporations. See,
e.g., Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1585, citing JAMES SULLIVAN,
OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1791); id. at
1622–23, citing Justice James Iredell, Observations on State Suability (1792). Iredell revisited
this notion in Chisholm. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 447–48 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (contending that an
action in assumpsit against a state would lie only if the state were considered a subordinate
corporation, a position Iredell would “by no means admit”).
126

See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 447–48 (opinion of Iredell, J.).

127

Willis P. Whichard, James Iredell: Revolutionist, Constitutionalist, Jurist, in GERBER,
SERIATIM, supra note 115, at 198, 211.
128 See Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1618–19 (discussing Straphorst
v. Maryland, a contract dispute in which Dutch brothers sought to recover from the state of
Maryland in federal court); id. at 1621–25 (discussing Oswald v. New York, in which the
executor of a printer’s estate sued the state for recovery of unpaid services); id. at 1626–27
(discussing Hollingsworth v. Virginia, in which the Indiana Company sued the State of Virginia
over land claims in the western part of that state); id. at 1650–51 (discussing Vassal v.
Massachusetts, the case that motivated Massachusetts to lead the movement to pass the Eleventh
Amendment).
129

Doyle Mathis, Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
112, 115 (1968).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss4/7

22

2019]

ORIGINALISM AND SECOND-ORDER IPSE DIXIT

581

Savannah.130 Farquhar was not paid.131 Farquhar died in 1784, and Chisholm, as
executor of his estate, pursued Farquhar’s claim. 132 After the Georgia legislature voted
not to pay the claim in 1789, Chisholm brought his claim in federal court. 133 Justice
Iredell, sitting with Nathaniel Pendleton of the U.S. District Court for Georgia, heard
the case as a U.S. Circuit Court judge.134 They dismissed the case for want of
jurisdiction, and Chisholm appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.135 Despite repeated
invitations from the Court, Georgia refused to appear to argue the case. 136
Four of the five Justices issued opinions in Chisholm’s favor. 137 The reasoning of
the Justices in the majority broke down along two lines. Two Justices relied primarily
on the text of Article III, which provides for federal jurisdiction over
“controversies . . . between a State and citizens of another State.”138 That provision
exactly describes the situation at hand, and so, as a textual matter, it seems obviously
to confer jurisdiction. However, two Justices in the majority focused less on the
constitutional text than on the nature of sovereignty under the Constitution. 139 For
them, sovereignty resided in the people and in the federal government.140 States were
not sovereign and thus could claim no sovereign immunity to suit. 141
Justice Iredell disagreed with the outcome. 142 He regarded Article III as what we
today call non-self-executing.143 That is, some constitutional provisions are selfexecuting. They are binding law as soon as the Constitution goes into effect. No further
action is required to make them enforceable law, although in cases such as Mapp v.

130

Id. at 115.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Id. at 115.

134

Id. at 116.

135

Id.

136

Id. The Court went so far as to invite any member of the bar in attendance to speak in
opposition to Chisholm’s suit, but none volunteered. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra
note 123, at 1631.
137

See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 466 (1793).

138

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

139

See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 466.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id. at 449–50.

143

John Marshall first introduced the idea that some constitutional provisions are not selfexecuting. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (holding that treaties are not
immediately operative as domestic law when they, by their terms, call for some additional
legislative act), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 89 (1833).
The term “self-executing” first appeared in Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)
(noting that stipulations that are not self-executing require legislation).
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Ohio, a court may have to use its common-law powers to fashion a remedy. 144 For
example, the President became Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (once
called into service)145 as soon as the Constitution was ratified. Congress did not need
to pass a statute giving him such powers, because the Commander-in-Chief Clause is
regarded as self-executing. By way of contrast, the Supreme Court has held that,
notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause,146 which renders treaties “supreme law,”
treaties do not automatically create binding domestic law. 147 Non-self-executing
treaties require congressional implementation before they can have effect as part of
our domestic legal system.148
In Justice Iredell’s view, the Constitution set the outer bounds of the federal courts’
jurisdiction, but the courts could not exercise the full scope of that jurisdiction without
congressional authorization, which was wanting in Chisholm.149 The outcome of the
case turned on second-order ipse dixit determinations about the nature of the legal
issue and the interpretive methods to be deployed. Four Justices combined textual
approaches with historical and purposivist approaches, and allowed for the exercise of
federal jurisdiction.150 Justice Iredell combined a structural approach to the
Constitution with a historical inquiry into the exercise of jurisdiction in cases against
states.151 All Justices were attempting to construe the Constitution, but they arrived at
different conclusions as to the meaning of that document because their opinions
stemmed from ipse dixit determinations not defended in the text of their opinions.
The Justices do not express disagreement with one another or even engage one
another’s arguments.152 Each speaks for himself, and each opinion turns, at crucial
junctures, on ipse dixit reasoning.153 Far from deferring to the intentions of the
Framers, all of the Justices, including Justice Iredell, reject (again without
acknowledgement or discussion) Alexander Hamilton’s assurances in Federalist No.

144 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (creating the exclusionary rule as a remedy for
violations of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unlawful searches and seizures).
145 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be commander in chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into
the actual service of the United States.”).
146 See U.S. CONST. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land . . . .”).
147 See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 519 (2008) (citing nineteenth-century authorities
for the proposition that treaties are non-self-executing and do not have effect as domestic law
when “they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect”).
148

See id. at 504–05.

149

See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 433 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.).

150

See id. at 419.

151

See id. at 433 (opinion of Iredell, J.).

152

See generally id.

153

Id.
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81154 and similar statements by others during the ratification process that the states
would retain their sovereign immunity under the new Constitution. 155 At the same
time, each Justice strives to give effect to the Constitution as he understands it.
B. The Justices as Framers
In Justice Iredell’s dissenting opinion, which is now regarded as vindicated with
the passage of the Eleventh Amendment,156 he states that he is giving effect to the
Framers’ intentions.157 He alone of the five Justices who heard the case would have
held that federal courts have no jurisdiction over a suit between a state and a citizen
of another state.158 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Iredell rejected two possible
interpretations offered by Attorney General Edmund Randolph, who served as counsel
for Chisholm.159 Justice Iredell certainly had no greater claim than Randolph to
insights into what the Framers of Article III intended. Unlike some of his colleagues
on the Chisolm Court, Justice Iredell did not attend the Constitutional Convention,160
apparently for want of means rather than want of interest.161 Randolph was not only
there; he introduced the Virginia Plan. 162 Although he refused to sign the document at
the end of the Constitutional Convention, Randolph changed his mind163 and, as chair

154

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(arguing that states retain their sovereignty under the Constitution and that sovereign entities
are not amenable to suit without their consent).
155 See JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER: A SOURCE BOOK OF EARLY AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION HISTORY 70 (1991) [hereinafter POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER] (noting that the
Chisholm opinion “upset expectations created by ratification assurances . . . that the states
would retain their sovereign immunity”); Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at
1599–1603 (citing examples from the ratification debates suggesting that Federalists, including
Madison, Marshall, Hamilton, and Rufus King, conceded that the powers of the federal courts
should be strictly (or narrowly) construed so as to preserve state sovereignty).

But see John V. Orth, Truth About Justice Iredell’s Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia
(1793), 73 N.C. L. REV. 255, 263 (1994) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment went well
beyond Justice Iredell’s opinion, which limited itself to the subject of assumpsit).
156

See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 433 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“The Constitution intended this
article . . . to be the subject of a Legislative act.”).
157

158 See id. at 449 (concluding that Article III must be implemented through legislation and
that such legislation is wanting with respect to suits between a state and a citizen of another
state).

See id. at 430 (“[A]fter the fullest consideration, I have been able to bestow on the
subject, and the most respectful attention to the able argument of the Attorney-General, I am
now decidedly of the opinion that no such action as this before the Court can legally be
maintained.”).
159

160

CASTO, supra note 66, at 62.

See Whichard, supra note 128, at 198, 206–07 (ascribing Iredell’s absence from the
Convention to his “cursed poverty” but noting his influence on the North Carolina delegation
through correspondence).
161

162

Farrand, supra note 75, at 20–22.

163 MAIER, supra note 78, at 261 (describing Randolph as having “made his peace” with
ratification as “the anchor of our political salvation, with amendments to follow under Article
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of the Virginia Ratification Convention, where some of the most storied debates took
place,164 became one of the Constitution’s greatest advocates. 165 Iredell, meanwhile,
was a “star speaker” at North Carolina’s Hillsborough Convention,166 which voted not
to ratify the Constitution without amendments.167 North Carolina ratified the
Constitution in November 1789 after the new Constitution had already gone into
effect.168
In his Chisholm opinion, Justice Iredell refers to the intentions of the Framers, but
he cites to no evidence of such intention. Rather, he cites to the text and to practice
and custom.169 Significantly, he rejects without discussion Randolph’s proffered
arguments, drawing on the Law of Nations 170 and policy considerations.171 Justice
Iredell’s position was not that such considerations are per se inadmissible to decide a
constitutional case; rather, Justice Iredell saw no need to consult either when the
constitutional case was, in his view, clear.172
The other Justices, who agreed with Randolph’s view that the exercise of
jurisdiction was proper, included John Jay, one of the authors of The Federalist
Papers, and James Wilson, a member of the Constitutional Convention’s Committee
of Detail,173 as well as a leader of Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention.174 Many
scholars consider Wilson “as crucial a member of the Constitutional Convention as
any other, including James Madison.”175 Justice William Cushing served as Vice

V”).
Id. at 257 (observing that Patrick Henry forced the Virginia Convention to “confront big
questions . . . that had not been explored, certainly not with equal rhetorical flare, in any
previous ratifying convention”).
164

165 Id. at 260 (describing Randolph as the “obvious person” to answer Patrick Henry’s
criticisms of the Constitution); id. at 320 (quoting contemporary commentary that Randolph
“amazed everyone” with his enthusiastic support for ratification).
166 Id. at 406; see also id. at 411 (describing Iredell as having taken the lead in defending
the Constitution at the Hillsborough Convention).
167

Id. at 421.

168

Id. at 457.

169

See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 433 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.).

170 See id. at 449 (remarking that he had had no “occasion to notice many arguments offered
by the Attorney General relating to the Law of Nations”).
171

See id. at 450 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (noting that a court should entertain policy
considerations only if the case is “very doubtful” and that in this case his own view of policy
diverged from that of the Attorney General).
172 See id. at 449 (finding no need to discuss the Law of Nations where domestic law clearly
provided no basis for jurisdiction).
173

William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 202 (2012).

MAIER, supra note 78, at 103–15 (describing Wilson’s role as the only member of the
federal convention present and as the chief expounder and defender of the Constitution at the
Pennsylvania convention).
174

175 Barnett, The People or the State?, supra note 133, at 1733; see also Mark D. Hall, James
Wilson: Democratic Theorist and Supreme Court Justice, in SERIATIM, supra note 115, at 126,
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President of the Massachusetts ratifying convention. 176 John Blair represented Virginia
in the Constitutional Convention177 and was a quiet defender of a strong national
government at the Virginia ratifying convention. 178 Prior to that, he had been an
important legislator179 and jurist in Virginia180 before being among the first men whom
George Washington nominated to the Supreme Court. 181 If the point of the exercise
was to determine the intentions of the Framers, Justice Iredell could have surveyed the
Framers assembled around him. Iredell arrived at his conclusions by other means, not
even citing evidence of the Framers’ intentions that supported his position. 182
C. The Opinions
Taking the opinions of Chisholm together, we see the Justices engaging in
numerous modes of constitutional interpretation, but each opinion turns on its author’s
idiosyncratic reasoning. Justice Iredell’s opinion turns on his view that the
Constitution’s Article III is not self-executing.183 Justice Blair assumes the opposite,
and thus, concludes that the text of Article III as written gives rise to federal
jurisdiction without the need for statutory authorization.184 Justice Cushing’s approach
is very similar. He rejects Justice Iredell’s position without mentioning it and without
engaging with Iredell’s arguments. 185 Justice Wilson focuses on the nature of
sovereignty, and his opinion turns on his view that sovereignty rests with the people
or with the union but not with the states. 186 Chief Justice Jay’s opinion similarly
focuses on the nature of sovereignty. 187 Regarding sovereignty as residing with the
people, he rejects Georgia’s claim that sovereign immunity deprives the federal courts
of jurisdiction over a suit against a state by a citizen of another state. 188

129 (citing seven prominent scholars of the Founding era who rank Wilson just behind Madison
as the most important figures at the Constitutional Convention).
176

See MAIER, supra note 78, at 193 (describing Cushing as vice president of the convention
and a leading federalist).
177 See Wythe Holt, John Blair: “A Safe and Conscientious Judge,” in SERIATIM, supra note
115, at 162 (noting that, according to Madison’s records, Blair never spoke at the Convention).
178 See CASTO, supra note 66, at 59. According to James Monroe, Blair said nothing but
favored the adoption of the Constitution. Holt, supra note 179, at 162.
179

See Holt, supra note 178 at 157–58.

180

See id. at 158–61.

181

Id. at 162.

182 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 432 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“The
framers of the Constitution, I presume, must have meant one of two things”).
183

See id. at 432–33.

184

See id. at 451 (opinion of Blair, J.).

185

See id. at 467 (opinion of Cushing, J.).

186

See id. at 454, 455, 458 (opinion of Wilson, J.).

187

See id. at 469–70 (opinion of Jay, J.).

188

See id. at 479.
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1. Justice Iredell and Assumpsit Claims Against the Sovereign
Justice Iredell had written on the question of whether states could be sued prior to
Chisholm.189 The issue arose in an earlier case, Oswald v. New York.190 It seems that
Iredell prepared an opinion for that case, which was dismissed on other grounds. 191
Iredell’s draft opinion became his draft essay, Observations on State Suability, which
he worked on in February 1792, but never finalized, 192 some of which found its way
into his Chisholm opinion.193 His opinion turns on two bits of second-order ipse dixit
reasoning. First, he decides that states are sovereign. 194 Second, he takes Article III of
the Constitution to be non-self-executing.195
Justice Iredell begins his analysis with a historical methodology, which remains
his primary mode of interpretation. Under English common law, Justice Iredell notes
at the outset, a court would have no jurisdiction over a case such as Chisholm’s,
sounding in assumpsit, against a sovereign. 196 Justice Iredell next turns to the text of
the Constitution and notes that Section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act follows the
Constitution and grants the Supreme Court non-exclusive jurisdiction over “civil
controversies” between a state and a citizen of another state. 197
Justice Iredell then entertains two possibilities for the meaning of the word
“controversies” in this context. First, Article III may have intended to convey “that
part of the Judicial power” not allocated to the other branches, but that reading would
entail an assumption that the “Judicial power” entails authority only relating to matters
over which common-law courts could exercise jurisdiction in the eighteenth
century.198 Second, Article III may be understood to empower Congress to create
federal jurisdiction with respect to the cases or controversies enumerated in Article
III.199 Such congressional action would be necessary where there was no common-law
basis for the exercise of such jurisdiction. 200 In other words, with respect to the
enumerated cases and controversies, Article III either granted the federal courts such
189

See Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1622.

190

See id.

191

See id. at 1622–23.

192 James Iredell, Observations on State Suability, (Feb. 11–14, 1792), reprinted in 5 DHSC,
supra note 125, at 76–88.
193

See Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1622–23.

194

See Iredell, supra note 193, at 82.

195

See Scott Douglas Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing, in SERIATIM, supra note
115, at 108.
196 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 430 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (noting
that, as the Attorney General surely knows, an action against the Crown in assumpsit will not
lie).
197

See id. at 431 (summarizing the Judiciary Act).

198

See id. at 432 (referring to “antecedent laws for the construction of the general words”

used).
199

See id.

See id. (allowing that Congress might be empowered to grant courts jurisdiction “at least
in cases where prior laws were deficient for such purposes . . . .”).
200
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jurisdiction as already existed under common law, or it granted that jurisdiction, plus
whatever additional jurisdiction Congress created pursuant to its Necessary and Proper
Clause powers.201
However, Attorney General Randolph offered a third possibility, which was,
Justice Iredell noted, “a construction, I confess, that I never heard of before, nor can I
now consider it grounded on any solid foundation[.]”202 That construction was that the
Constitution conveys to the judiciary the powers vested therein, without reference to
the eighteenth-century common-law background and without the need for further
action by the legislature.203 But in refuting Randolph’s view of the scope of federal
judicial power, Justice Iredell appealed not to the constitutional text nor to the
Framers’ intent but to his own conception of the judiciary:
My conception of the Constitution is entirely different. I conceive, that all
the Courts of the United States must receive, not merely their organization
as to the number of Judges of which they are to consist; but all their
authority, as to the manner of their proceeding, from the Legislature only. 204
In Justice Iredell’s view, the jurisdictional grants in Article III were non-selfexecuting. The federal courts could exercise jurisdiction only over cases over which
they would have had jurisdiction at common law or over cases that Congress, through
legislation, granted them. This reading of Article III grounds the legal reasoning that
follows.
Having rejected the Attorney General’s contention that the Constitution
automatically grants federal courts jurisdiction over all categories of cases enumerated
in Article III, Justice Iredell dutifully searches for a basis in positive law for the federal
courts’ exercise of jurisdiction in this case. Such jurisdiction could come from only
two sources, legislative act or common law. 205 He entertains the possibility that state
law could give rise to such an action, but he quickly concludes that Georgia law does
not do so, nor do the laws of any other state. 206
Justice Iredell turns back to the Judiciary Act, Section 14, which establishes the
courts’ powers to issue writs “which may be necessary for the exercise of their
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.” 207 He
seizes on the reference to “usages” to argue that the Act intended to limit the courts’
exercise of jurisdiction to those controversies over which they had traditionally had
jurisdiction under English common law. 208 Justice Iredell then undertakes an

201 See id. at 432 (referencing Congress’s Necessary and Proper Clause powers as the legal
basis for such action).
202

Id.

203

See id.

204

Id.

205

See id. at 434.

206

See id. at 434–35.

207

Id. at 433–34.

208

See id. at 434.
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exhaustive review of existing case law and concludes that no action at law existed
against the sovereign; the only remedy was a petition of right. 209
The remainder of the opinion looks like textualism informed by history and
precedent. However, the diversion into history is made possible through a crucial turn
at an ipse dixit crossroad.210 In Justice Iredell’s view, states are either just as sovereign
as the English King, or they are mere corporations subordinate to the federal
government.211 Facing this stark choice, Iredell could only treat states as sovereign,
stating: “The United States are sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually
surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the power reserved.” 212 The
notion that the Justices had to choose between treating states as sovereign and treating
them as corporations illustrates the nature of ipse dixit reasoning; no other Justice
expressed the view that states, not being sovereign, were mere corporations
subordinate to the federal government.213 Justice Iredell could not accept a world in
which states retain aspects of their sovereignty and yet surrender their sovereign
immunity to suit by ordinary citizens.214
Justice Iredell’s reasoning is as follows: (1) there must be a legislative enactment
giving the courts jurisdiction over an action in assumpsit against a state; (2) the
legislature has authorized no such action, and custom and usages recognize no such
action; therefore, (3) the courts are without jurisdiction. 215 All of this follows logically
from Justice Iredell’s principles, but his legal conclusion can persuade only those who
agree with his views that states are sovereign and that Article III is not self-executing.
Justice Iredell ultimately falls back on his own sense of what is fitting and proper
in constitutional arrangements. Such ipse dixit reasoning is inevitable, even within
originalist interpretive modalities, as originalist interpretation can point towards many
different solutions. Ultimately, the judge has to choose the conclusion that seems right,
even though the alternatives are plausible. Justice Iredell’s logic is sound, but it
assumes that states are sovereign and that Article III is non-self-executing, and those
propositions cannot be proven or disproven based on appeal to original meaning or

209

See id. at 437–46.

I am not the first to characterize Iredell’s opinion as ipse dixit. See CASTO, supra note 66,
at 190 (calling Iredell’s opinion “superficially comprehensive” and accusing Iredell of engaging
in “virtual ipse dixit” and question begging).
210

211

See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 435, 447 (opinion of Iredell, J.).

212

Id. at 435; see also id. at 447–49 (rejecting the notion that states are corporations
subordinate to the federal government).
213 Attorney General Randolph addressed the argument only to dismiss it as irrelevant to the
case. Id. at 429 (argument of Att’y Gen. Randolph) (“I banish the comparison of States with
corporations; and, therefore, search for no resemblance in them.”). Justice Cushing finds that
the question is not whether states are corporations but “what are their powers?” Id. at 468
(opinion of Cushing, J.). Justice Wilson says something similar, at much greater length, as is
his wont. He notes that a state is an “artificial person” and goes on to characterize the range of
attributes that such an artificial person might have. Id. at 455 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
214

Compare id. at 435 (opinion of Iredell, J.), with id. at 447.

215

See id. at 449.
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intention.216 As is clear from the differing views of the Justices in Chisholm, the
Framers left the issue unaddressed and made different and irreconcilable assumptions
as to its resolution.
In his conclusion, Justice Iredell frankly states that he sees no need to address the
majority of Attorney General Randolph’s arguments on behalf of Chisholm. 217 “I have
not had occasion to notice many arguments offered by the Attorney General, which
certainly were very proper, as to his extended view of the case, but do not affect
mine.”218 So it is when opinions are informed by different ipse dixit perspectives.
2. Justice Blair’s “Unimaginative”219 Textualism
Justice Blair, in his short opinion in Chisholm, announces, “The Constitution of
the United States is the only fountain from which I shall draw; the only authority to
which I shall appeal,”220 thus saving himself the trouble of addressing the arguments
of his brethren, Jay, Wilson, and Iredell. In short order, he reads the constitutional text
as clearly conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear a controversy between
a state and a citizen of another state.221 The only question for him was whether a state
could be a defendant in such a case.222 Reviewing other areas of the federal courts’
jurisdiction, Justice Blair quickly concludes that the Constitution is best understood as
granting the federal courts jurisdiction regardless of the state’s status as plaintiff or
defendant.223 After all, federal courts have jurisdiction over cases involving two
states,224 and in such a case, one of the states must be the defendant. 225 Moreover,
federal courts have jurisdiction over controversies “between a state . . . and foreign
states.”226 It is unlikely that a foreign state would be a defendant in a United States
court, so it seems that the last-named party could be a plaintiff as well as a defendant. 227
Justice Blair’s breezy conclusion that Article III eliminates the states’ sovereign
immunity to suit by a citizen of another state also ignores significant evidence that the
216

But see Scott Douglass Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing, in SERIATIM, supra
note 114, at 108 [hereinafter Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing] (accusing Iredell of
ignoring “the plain words of the Constitution”).
217

See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 449 (opinion of Iredell, J.).

218

Id.

219 CASTO, supra note 66, at 192. But see Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing, supra
note 219, at 109 (defending Blair’s and Cushing’s textualism).
220

Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 450 (opinion of Blair, J.).

221 See id. at 450 (opinion of Blair, J.) (finding that this case “undoubtedly” comes within
the scope of cases over which Article III grants federal courts jurisdiction, unless the purpose
of the language is to permit only cases initiated by a state).
222

See id. at 450–51 (opinion of Blair, J.).

223

See id. at 451.

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (giving federal courts jurisdiction over “controversies
between two or more states”).
224

225

See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 451 (opinion of Blair, J.).

226

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

227

See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 451 (opinion of Blair, J.).
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Framers had a contrary intention. John Marshall, responding to anti-Federalists in the
Virginia Ratification Convention, insisted that Article III would not grant federal
courts jurisdiction over states as defendants for the obvious reason, “It is not rational
to suppose, that the sovereign power should be dragged before a Court.”228 James
Sullivan, the Massachusetts Attorney General and an early voice in support of the
Eleventh Amendment, also thought Article III best construed as granting federal
courts jurisdiction only when the state was a plaintiff in a suit against a citizen of
another state.229 Given that the issue in Chisholm had already been raised in other
federal cases, Blair likely knew that even many staunch federalists read Article III
differently. He did not feel the need to address their arguments, and indeed what could
he do other than point to the text?
Justice Blair does consider the practical question of enforcement of judgments
against states but finds the issue easily resolved. If a state were to resist the
enforcement of a federal court judgment against it, the same action could then be
brought in state court, and Justice Blair imagines that the federal judgment would be
treated as res judicata.230 It is in this context that he briefly addresses Justice Iredell’s
arguments about the common-law tradition that courts did not entertain actions in
assumpsit against sovereign states. He sees “no reason for confining the Plaintiff to
proceed by way of petition,” and he notes that doing so might even be an
“impropriety.”231 By adopting the Constitution, Georgia forfeited that aspect of its
sovereignty.232 His reasoning seems purely textualist, but, by not looking beyond the
text, Justice Blair also engages in ipse dixit reasoning, deeming Article III selfexecuting without inquiry.
3. Justice Wilson on Sovereignty Under General Principles of Right
Justice Wilson’s opinion is a short treatise in political theory. As Randy Barnett
has noted, Justice Wilson relies primarily on “‘general theories of right’ and only
secondarily on the constitutional text.”233 Although Wilson had a pecuniary interest in
the outcome of the case,234 his reasoning in Chisholm is consistent with his views
expressed in other contexts.235
228

See Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1601 (quoting remarks of John
Marshall in the Virginia Convention, June 20, 1788).
229 See Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1619 (citing JAMES SULLIVAN,
OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1791)).
230 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 452 (opinion of Blair, J.) (“Might [plaintiff] not rely upon the
judgment given by this Court in bar of the new suit? To me it seems clear that he might.”).
231

Id.

232

See id.

233

Barnett, The People or the State?, supra note 13, at 1731.

234 See CASTO, supra note 66, at 195 (recounting Wilson’s interest in the Indiana Company
that was a party to a case raising the same issue in Hollingsworth v. Virginia).
235

See id. Although Kurt Lash regards Justice Wilson and Chief Justice Jay as having had
“significant conflicts of interest” in Chisholm (Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note
123, at 1694), Casto points out that eighteenth-century judges saw no need to recuse themselves
when they had an interest in the outcome of a case, as they had sworn an oath to do justice in
any case. CASTO, supra note 66, at 195 (citing Blackstone).
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His method of constitutional exposition in the initial section has little to do with
textual interpretation. His only source material is the logic of what he calls “principles
of general jurisprudence.”236 He proceeds by Socratic method, posing questions and
immediately answering them and dismissing all possible objections. 237 He begins with
a discussion of the nature of states as aggregates of persons. 238 States, he says, as
“artificial persons,” can do many of the things that natural persons can do. 239 They can
take on legal obligations, and when they do so, they cannot seek to avoid them by
claiming that they are sovereign.240
But, that conclusion is of little importance to Justice Wilson’s analysis, as he
rejects Georgia’s claim to sovereignty in any case. 241 First, he argues, the Constitution
has no sovereign in one sense, because it creates a republican government with
citizens, not subjects.242 Second, in a republic, sovereignty resides in the people.243 “As
to the purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is NOT a sovereign state.” 244 Finally,
Georgia is obviously not sovereign in the sense that term has in the context of
feudalism, because the feudal system “never extended to the American States.” 245
Justice Wilson next conducts a historical review even more searching than that of
Justice Iredell, tracing notions of sovereignty back to the ancient Greeks. 246 He finds
various traditions, including those of the Spaniards of Aragon, England up to the time
of Edward I, and Frederick the Great’s Prussia, in which the Crown was not above the
law and could be sued even by a commoner.247 This discussion leads him to the
conclusion that, for the purposes of the federal union, Georgia is not a sovereign at
all.248 Indeed, Justice Wilson places the sovereignty of the Union itself at a lower rank
than the sovereignty of the people of the United States. 249
Justice Wilson has no doubt that, as a matter of general political theory, the
Constitution could vest power in the federal judiciary to hear a case between a state

236

Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 457 (Wilson, J.).

See, e.g., id. at 456 (“Is the foregoing description of a State a true description? It will not
be questioned but it is.”); id. (asking whether a state may escape its legal obligations by asserting
its sovereignty and answering “Surely not”).
237

238

See id. at 455.

239

Id.

240

See id. at 455–56.

241

See id. at 457.

242

See id. at 456.

243

See id. at 457.

244

Id.

245

Id.

246

Id. at 459.

247

Id. at 458–61.

248

Id. at 461.

See id. at 462 (arguing that to toast the United States was not “politically correct;” one
ought really to toast the “People of the United States”).
249
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and a citizen of another state.250 Justice Wilson then questions whether the
Constitution, empowered to do so, actually did create such jurisdiction.251 His initial
interpretive methodology is intentionalist and purposive. He notes that the Articles of
Confederation established no power to regulate individual citizens but only the
states.252 “That defect was remedied by the national constitution,” Justice Wilson
notes, but the Constitution does not strip the federal government of its power to
regulate states as well as its citizens.253 Justice Wilson then determines that the
Constitution in fact conveys jurisdiction over Chisholm’s case to the courts by virtue
of the Constitution’s express “objects” and its “general texture.” 254
In his penultimate paragraph, Justice Wilson points out that the Constitution
expressly creates federal jurisdiction over controversies between a state and a citizen
of another state.255 He also echoes (without acknowledgment) Justice Blair’s reading
that, if federal courts have jurisdiction over cases between states, one of those states
must be the defendant.256 He had previously pointed to the Contracts Clause, 257 which
would be a meaningless provision if courts were not empowered to enforce it against
states.258
Justice Wilson’s methodology thus brings together textual, intentionalist,
historical, and teleological modes of interpretation. However, Justice Wilson grounds
his opinion not in law, but in political theory. While he and Justice Iredell both look
to history, they reference completely different categories of history, and even where
their opinions contradict one another, neither acknowledges the other’s arguments.
The opinions pass in the night, having launched from different ports and sailed in
opposite directions.
4. Justice Cushing: Ipse Dixit Exemplified
Justice Cushing rejects all appeals to history and bases his opinion solely on the
constitutional text, which he reads as establishing the federal courts’ jurisdiction over
the case.259 He dismisses, rather than reckons with, his colleagues approaches: “The
point turns not upon the law or practice of England . . . nor upon the law of any other
country whatever. . . .”260 He acknowledges, as did Justice Blair, the possibility that
250

Id. at 464.

251

Id.

252

Id.

See id. at 464 (“[T]he people of the United States intended to bind the several States, by
the Legislative power of the national Government.”).
253

254 See id. at 465 (including among the Constitution’s “objects” goals such as creating a
more perfect union and establishing justice).
255

Id. at 466.

256

Id.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts”).
257

258

Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 465 (opinion of Wilson, J.).

259

Id. at 466–67 (opinion of Cushing, J.).

260

Id. at 466.
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the Constitution intended to create jurisdiction only where the state was a plaintiff, but
he rejects this reading of the Constitution for want of textual evidence in its favor. 261
Justice Cushing does directly respond to Justice Iredell’s concern that states will
be reduced to the status of subordinate corporations.262 For Justice Cushing, the term
“corporation” is not necessary.263 The main point is that the Constitution details the
allocation of sovereign powers. It lodges many sovereign powers with Congress, 264
and it prohibits states from engaging in other activities associated with sovereignty. 265
It may well be that states retain aspects of their sovereignty, but immunity to suit in
federal courts has been eliminated by Article III’s express terms. Because the
Constitution’s language clearly grants to courts jurisdiction over suits such as
Chisholm’s, the states’ only recourse would be to make use of the amendment
process.266
Justice Cushing does not address or acknowledge Justice Iredell’s historical
arguments;267 rather, he simply declares his contrary conclusion:
A second question made in the case was, whether the particular action of
assumpsit could lie against a State? I think assumpsit will lie, if any suit;
provided a State is capable of contracting. 268
It would be hard to formulate a purer expression of ipse dixit reasoning. Justice
Cushing has no interest in Justice Iredell’s arguments because he engages only in
textual analysis. In this case, at least, he sees no need to look beyond the plain meaning
of the text.
5. Chief Justice Jay on Sovereignty Under the Constitution
Like Justice Wilson, Chief Justice Jay was not disinterested in the outcome of
Chisholm. He had no pecuniary interest in the case, but if Georgia prevailed, that
outcome would make the Treaty of Paris, which Jay had helped negotiate, more
difficult to implement.269 More generally, Jay joined the Court, in part, in order to
Id. at 467; see also id. at 476 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (“If the Constitution really meant to
extend these powers only to those controversies in which a State might be Plaintiff, to the
exclusion of those in which citizens had demands against a State, it is inconceivable that it
should have attempted to convey that meaning in words, not only so incompetent, but also
repugnant to it.”).
261

262

Id. at 468 (opinion of Cushing, J.).

263

Id.

264

See id. (listing some of the powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution).

265

See id. (listing some of the limitations on state powers named in Article I, Section 10 of
the Constitution).
266 See id. (“If the Constitution is found inconvenient in practice in this or any other
particular, it is well that a regular mode is pointed out for amendment.”).

Casto thus calls Justice Cushing, like Justice Blair, “unimaginative.” CASTO, supra note
66, at 192.
267

268

Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 469 (opinion of Cushing, J).

See Sandra Frances Van Burkleo, “Honor, Justice, and Interest:” John Jay’s Republican
Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench, in GERBER, SERIATIM, supra note 115, at 26,
48 (“At issue was Georgia’s constitutional right to resist federal judicial power in a dispute
269
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ensure the enforceability of the United States’ international obligations against the
states.270 In Jay’s opinion, the nation properly provided for a national judiciary in order
to address “evils” such as the delinquency of state courts in abiding by the international
obligations of the United States.271
The Chief Justice’s opinion begins by outlining the questions to be addressed: (1)
Georgia’s status a sovereign state, (2) whether such a sovereign can be sued, and (3)
whether the Constitution authorizes a suit such as Chisholm’s. 272 Jay’s approach
combines elements of the approaches of Justices Iredell and Wilson. He, like Wilson,
focuses on the nature of sovereignty. Like Wilson, Jay treats individuals as the sources
of sovereignty,273 but like Iredell he is interested ultimately only in the version of
sovereignty embodied in the Constitution. 274 That document, for Chief Justice Jay, is
a compact among the people, who transferred many prerogatives to the federal
government.275
Chief Justice Jay contrasts European sovereignty, which resides in the princes who
exercise it, with sovereignty under the Constitution, which resides in the people for
whom governmental authorities act as agents. 276 In addition, European sovereignty is
based on feudal principles in which the people are subjects, not citizens. 277
Assumptions derived from European sovereignty are inapposite when applied to a
compact among sovereign citizens.278
Turning to the text of the Constitution, the Chief Justice combines purposive and
textualist approaches, beginning with the Constitution’s Preamble,279 which he uses to
identify the policy considerations underlying each grant of jurisdiction in Article III,
Section 2.280 The text of Article III clearly seems to convey jurisdiction over
Chisholm’s case, unless it is read to cover only cases in which the state is the plaintiff.
The Chief Justice rejects this argument because, “[i]t is politic, wise, and good that,
not only the controversies, in which a State is Plaintiff, but also those in which a State
is Defendant, should be settled.”281 Returning to a form of textualism, the Chief Justice
involving the Paris peace, and thus to invite renewed conflict with Britain and fresh castigation
of Americans in Europe.”).
270

Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1694.

271

Chisholm, 2 U.S. 419, 474 (1793) (opinion of Jay, J.).

272

Id. at 470.

See id. at 479 (affirming the “great and glorious principle, that the people are the
sovereign of this country . . . .”).
273

274

Id. at 471.

See id. at 468 (pointing to various constitutional provisions as “a most essential
abridgement of State sovereignty”).
275

276

Id. at 471.

277

Id.

278

Id. at 471–72; see also id. at 456–57 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (finding that Georgia can
have no sovereign claims on its citizens and certainly not on citizens of another state).
279

Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 474–75 (opinion of Jay, J.).

280

Id. at 475–76.

281

Id. at 476.
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then points out that, if the Framers meant to preclude federal courts from the exercise
of jurisdiction over cases in which a state is the defendant, they could have expressly
so stated.282
On one point, the Chief Justice does engage Justice Iredell’s opinion directly. He
does so not by specifically addressing Justice Iredell, but by simply stating an
opposing view.283 Underlying Justice Iredell’s broad reading of state sovereignty is a
canon of construction that delegations of sovereignty ought to be strictly construed. 284
Thus, because the Constitution does not state that its object was to make states
amendable to suits in cases sounding in assumpsit, courts ought not to assume such an
intention. Chief Justice Jay’s perspective is that the expansion of the jurisdiction of
the federal courts to cover states is “remedial” and thus is to be “construed liberally.”285
The Chief Justice’s opinion is unusual, in that it acknowledges a strong textual
argument on the other side. If citizens can sue a state, they should also be able to sue
the United States, as Article III uses similar language to create jurisdiction over suits
involving states and suits involving the United States.286 The Chief Justice has no
textual or even any legal argument in response. Rather, he simply maintains that, while
the federal executive can enforce judgments against the states, there is no power that
can enforce a decision against the federal government. 287 He then concludes by
apologizing for a hastily written opinion that cites neither cases nor other authority,
but he assures his readers that “former Congresses and the State Conventions are
replete with similar ideas.”288 Finally, he appeals to honesty, utility, and “the great
moral truth, that justice is the same whether due from one man or a million.” 289
D. Ipse Dixit Reasoning in Seriatim Opinions
From the modern perspective, it may seem that the swift passage of the Eleventh
Amendment was a legislative overrule of Chisholm,290 proving that Justice Iredell got
things right. However, that conclusion is by no means obvious. Kurt Lash has argued
that the Eleventh Amendment was already in the works before Chisholm was

282

Id. at 476–77.

283

Id. at 476.

284 See id. at 450 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (maintaining that “nothing but express words, or an
insurmountable implication” would justify permitting a suit against a state); see also Lash,
Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 122, at 1640–41 (elaborating on Iredell’s strict
constructionist approach to limitation on sovereignty).
285

Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 476 (opinion of Jay, J.). Lash also notes the disagreement between
Chief Justice Jay and Justice Iredell. See Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 122, at
1635 (calling the Chief Justice’s approach “precisely the opposite of the rule of strict
construction that excludes application of federal power against the states unless called for by
express enumeration or unavoidable implication”).
286

Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 478 (opinion of Jay, J.).

287

Id.

288

Id.

289

Id. at 479.

290

See Orth, supra note 157, at 256 (noting that the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment
took place less than two years after Chisholm was decided).
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decided.291 As Randy Barnett points out, the passage of the Eleventh Amendment
could signify that the Court correctly interpreted the Constitution, but the states
decided that they did not like this consequence of the Constitution and so followed
constitutional procedures for amendment. 292 John Marshall observed in Fletcher v.
Peck, that “[t]he [C]onstitution, as passed, gave the courts of the United States
jurisdiction in suits brought against individual States.”293 Justice Wilson and Chief
Justice Jay both rejected any notion that states could not be sued.294 Even Justice
Iredell did not deny Congress’s power under the Constitution to create federal
jurisdiction over suits like Chisholm.295 He simply did not think that Congress had
done so in the Judiciary Act of 1789.296 He held, as a matter of statutory construction
only, that states could not be sued. 297 The outcome of the case turned on whether
Justice Iredell was correct that the Constitution’s Article III is not self-executing. None
of the other Justices addressed that claim directly. Justice Wilson came closest, but
while Justice Iredell focused on the legacy of the English common law, Justice Wilson
surveyed constitutional law dating back to the ancient Greeks. 298
The swift passage of the Eleventh Amendment indicates that the United States of
1793 was not the United States of 1787, or even 1789. By 1793, the enthusiasm for
Federalism had waned significantly. 299 James Madison, a founding Federalist, was
already collaborating with Thomas Jefferson to form the Democratic-Republican
Party, the political opposition to what would become the Federalist Party.300 Attacks
on Chisholm appeared in the partisan, anti-Federalist press.301
The five opinions of the Court show that the Justices appeal to history, the
constitutional text, read in light of the document’s purposes, and relevant political
theory. They reference the intentions of the drafters or ratifiers without specifying
which intentions matter, but they undertake no investigation into those intentions.
291 Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1692 (“Chisholm occurred midway
down the road to the Eleventh Amendment”).
292

Barnett, The People or the State?, supra note 13, at 1737.

293

10 U.S. 87, 139 (1810).

294

Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 466, 478 (opinions of Wilson, J. and Jay, J.)

295 See Orth, supra note 157, at 263 (noting Justice Iredell’s insistence that his decision was
based on the statutory text and not on the Constitution).
296

Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 449 (opinion of Iredell, J.).

297

Id. at 436 (opinion of Iredell, J.).

298

Id. at 459 (opinion of Wilson, J.).

299 See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788–1800 288 (1993) (describing the elections of 1792 as the first in the
United States that were contested on a partisan basis, with republican interests aligned against
those associated with the Hamiltonian, federalist Treasury Department).
300

See, e.g., id. at 257–302 (recounting the advent of political parties beginning late in
1791); NOAH FELDMAN, THREE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON: GENIUS, PARTISAN, PRESIDENT 337–
71 (2017) (describing Madison’s founding of a democratic Republican party in opposition to
Hamiltonian Federalism).
301

See POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER, supra note 156, at 72 (citing a critical editorial in
The National Gazette, and other anti-Federalist sources).
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Each Justice started from some principle that he stated rather than proved, and in their
seriatim opinions, the Justices did not take up or refute each other’s principled stands.
Ultimately, each Chisholm opinion turns on ipse dixit reasoning rather than on an
appeal to evidence of the original meaning of the constitutional text or the original
intentions of the Framers.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EARLY COURT’S SECOND-ORDER IPSE
DIXIT DECISIONS
I have limited myself in this Article to a discussion of the practices of the preMarshall Court. I have argued, and used the Chisholm case to illustrate, that the
opinions of the pre-Marshall Court turned on second-order, ipse dixit reasoning. That
reasoning was neither originalist nor non-originalist. The Court embraced a nonhierarchical pluralism of interpretive approaches, and the opinions often turned on the
resolution of meta-interpretive issues decided without reference to any components of
the originalist toolkit and often based on commitments that sounded more in political
theory or policy than in law.
John Marshall transformed the U.S. Supreme Court. He eliminated seriatim
opinions302 in favor of unanimous opinions, the most important of which he authored
himself.303 But, he did not stray from the early Court’s non-hierarchical
methodological pluralism, nor did he reduce the role of second-order ipse dixit
reasoning in constitutional cases. Marshall’s approach to constitutional adjudication
then in turn became the model that American courts followed at least until the Lochner
Era. His contemporary, Joseph Story, suggested that Marshall’s epitaph should read:
“here lies the expounder of the Constitution.”304 John Bradley Thayer’s assessment
towards the turn of the twentieth century was that Marshall was preeminent in the field
of constitutional law, “first, and with no second.” 305
Marshall’s strategy of authoring majority opinions strengthened the authority of
the Court while sacrificing some transparency. Seriatim opinions make it easy to see
the Justices’ meta-interpretive moves. Under Marshall, the Court conveyed an
appearance of unanimity that suppressed evidence of rival approaches. Still, one can
see from the briefs of counsel and the critiques of the Marshall Court’s opinions in the
Republican press that Marshall’s approach was not the only one. His approach, like
that of the Chisholm Court, was grounded in political commitments and assumptions
about the nature of the Constitution that were asserted rather than reasoned.
What we today would call originalist methods of constitutional interpretation, such
as textualism and intentionalism, were part of the methodological toolkit available to
302 See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–35 191
(Abridged ed., 1991) (crediting Marshall with initiating the practice of writing the “opinion of
the Court”); Charles F. Hobson, The Marshall Court (1801–1835): Law, Politics, and the
Emergence of the Federal Judiciary, in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE 47, 57 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005) (observing that opinions during the Marshall
Court were “the product of collaborative deliberation, carried out in a spirit of mutual
concession and accommodation”).
303

See WHITE, supra note 305, at 191 (stating that Marshall wrote 547 opinions, while his
colleagues combined to write 574).
304 Quoted in JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION xi (1996); see
id. at 2 (calling John Marshall’s great decisions “the ABCs of American constitutional law”).
305

JOHN BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 56–57 (1901).
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Justices during the Early Republic and into the nineteenth century. However, such
approaches did not predominate. Reliance on text or on the Framers’ presumed
intentions informed some opinions, but those opinions were also informed, at a more
fundamental level, by perspectives that looked outside of the Constitution and beyond
the law. The opinions turned on determinations made outside of the frame of their
written opinions. Such second-order ipse dixit decisions were inevitable where the
constitutional text provided inadequate guidance and the Framers disagreed among
themselves as to its meaning. In the Early Republic, original meaning often ran out
before constitutional interpretation began. The early Justices’ legal opinions issued
from within a non-legal meta-interpretive frame.
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